DePaul Law Review
Volume 70
Issue 2 Winter 2020

Article 5

MDL Nationalism, Federalism, and the Opioid Epidemic
Abbe R. Gluck

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Abbe R. Gluck, MDL Nationalism, Federalism, and the Opioid Epidemic, 70 DePaul L. Rev. 321 (2022)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol70/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Digital Commons@DePaul. It has
been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons@DePaul. For more
information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\70-2\DPL206.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

16-DEC-21

15:55

MDL NATIONALISM, FEDERALISM, AND
THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC
Abbe R. Gluck1

I.

INTRODUCTION

Multidistrict litigation (MDL) is a nationalist animal in a federalist
system. It is a pragmatic, creative and modern response to the needs
of litigation in today’s national economy. As such, MDL has become
something of a force against the litigation federalism that is at the core
of traditional civil procedure. This should come as no surprise. In
many ways, that’s the point.
Although not the intent of the original drafters of the MDL statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1407,2 today, MDLs are formed to centralize into a single
federal court for resolution nationwide suits that often are not amenable to class action. Of course, class actions are often not possible due
to a key feature of federalism itself: differences across state law. And
almost all “mega” MDLs3 of this nature hold out as their goal “global
peace”—a settlement of all pending suits, including suits filed in state
courts and so outside of the MDL. In this push for settlement, the
gravitational force of large MDLs often pulls state actors and state
cases into the federal courts’ domain regardless of the formalities of
state-by-state jurisdiction and with little attention to state-law
variations.
This essay aims to focus new attention on MDL nationalism and
federalism. Is MDL’s emergence as a nationalist workaround to a fed1. Alfred M. Rankin Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Solomon Center for Health Law
and Policy, Yale Law School (currently on leave with the White House Counsel’s Office; all of
the author’s work on this article was completed prior to government service and the views expressed are the author’s own). Special thanks to Elizabeth Burch, Luther Strange, Ken Feinberg,
Jim Tierney, Judith Resnik, all of the Clifford organizers and participants, and my wonderful
students, Bardia Vaseghi, Simone Seiver, Timur Akman-Duffy, and Sherry Tanious.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018); Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat.
109 (1968) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018)); see also Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831, 840 (2017) (“The [drafters]
did not intend MDL . . . to be a stand-in should the mass-tort class action ultimately prove to be
unviable.”).
3. The types of cases centralized in MDLs run the gamut from securities, employment, and
antitrust to products liability, sales practices, and common disasters. My focus is on “mega”
MDLs—ones with 1,000 or more cases—because they are the ones exerting pressure on the
system, but the ways in which they do so can likewise impact smaller proceedings.
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eralist litigation system a symptom of broader cracks in the way traditional procedure applies (or fails to adequately apply) to modern
problems? And is this particular type of workaround—which has developed organically through generous judicial bending of the MDL
statute and the Federal Rules—the way we want the system to evolve?
Would a more formal change—such as a new statute, perhaps one that
thinks about aspects of federalism we might wish to preserve—be
preferable?
Only a few years ago, MDL was the best kept not-so-secret in civil
procedure, known well to insiders but little known to mainstream litigation and procedure scholars. Even as MDL cases grew to comprise
some forty percent (!) of the federal docket4—a truly shocking statistic considering that many lawyers hardly know what MDL is—scholarship remained limited,5 and MDLs largely remained absent from
law school casebooks and teaching.6 The last few years changed that,
with a wave of important scholarship7 (also coinciding with the fiftieth
anniversaries of the class action rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) 23, and the MDL statute) and high-profile litigation utilizing
the MDL’s tools and creative options.8
No litigation has had a higher profile or brought more federalism
issues into high salience than In re Opiates,9 the MDL centralizing
some 2,800 cases that comprise the bulk of the litigation arising out of
the national opioid crisis, together with the constellation of more than
4. Judith Resnik, “Vital” State Interests: From Representative Actions for Fair Labor Standards
to Pooled Trusts, Class Actions, and MDLs in the Federal Courts, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1767
(2017).
5. The work of Elizabeth Burch is a major exception. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,
Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 667 (2013); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Group Consensus,
Individual Consent, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506 (2011).
6. For the limited casebook attention to MDLs, see, e.g., OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNIK,
ADJUDICATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 593–94, 96–98 (2003); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 380–82 (11th ed. 2013); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.
ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 320–21 (11th ed. 2015); LINDA J.
SILBERMAN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 311, 979, 1111–12 (4th ed. 2013);
STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND CONTEXT 1074 (5th
ed. 2016).
7. More recent scholarship includes, for example, Andrew D. Bradt, Something Less and
Something More: MDL’s Roots as a Class Action Alternative, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1711, 1712
(2017); Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in
Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1259 (2017); Alexandra D. Lahav, A Primer on Bellwether Trials, 37 REV. LITIG. 185 (2018); Adam S. Zimmerman, The Bellwether Settlement, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 2275 (2017).
8. See, e.g., Transfer Order, In re Juul Labs, Inc., Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 3:19-md-02913-WHO (J.P.M.L. Oct. 2, 2019); Transfer Order, In re Gen. Motors, LLC Ignition Switch Litig., MDL No. 2543 (J.P.M.L. June 9, 2014).
9. Transfer Order, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (J.P.M.L.
Dec. 12, 2017).
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500 state-court and municipality opioid lawsuits running in parallel
across the country.10
The opioid litigation offers the starkest example yet of the challenges and opportunities that our federalist and overlapping system
poses for litigation on a national scale—and also for subsequent settlement and preclusion. State Attorneys General (AGs), state courts,
state laws, state governments, state localities all come into play. So too
do our other court systems and national actors, including the Department of Justice, tribal courts, and the bankruptcy courts.
Forty-nine state AGs have filed a case against at least one party
involved in the MDL.11 All of them are in state court.12 More than
2,000 localities, on the other hand, have filed in federal court—and so
are now in the MDL—empowered by attorneys willing to bring their
cases on a contingency-fee basis and emboldened to proceed on their
own by memories of the massive 1990s tobacco litigation, after which
some states gave localities short shrift.13 In Opiates, localities are
mostly using private attorneys to represent them in federal court,
while their own public state legal actors—their AGs—proceed in their
separate state court systems.
For the most part, only the localities who actually filed in federal
court want to be there. As such, the MDL has been punctuated by
various disputes brought by other actors over efforts to remand cases
to state court or keep them there in the face of removal motions. For
example, the Cherokee Nation had initially sued in tribal court, but
that suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Nation then sued
in state court, and the case was removed to federal court.14 Today,
more than eighty state and federally recognized Indian tribes are in
10. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner State of Ohio at 10, In re State of Ohio, No. 19-3827 (6th Cir. Sept. 6, 2019)
[hereinafter Brief of Chamber of Commerce].
11. David Eggert, Michigan Sues Opioid Distributors Under Drug Dealer Law, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Dec. 17, 2019, 9:07 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2019-1217/michigan-sues-opioid-distributors-likens-to-drug-dealers (“Michigan [is] the 49th state to
have filed some kind of legal action against the opioid industry. Only Nebraska has not.”).
12. Brief of Chamber of Commerce at 10–11, In re State of Ohio, No. 19-3827 (6th Cir. Sept.
6, 2019).
13. See, e.g., CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS ET AL., BROKEN PROMISES TO OUR CHILDREN: A STATE-BY-STATE LOOK AT THE 1998 TOBACCO SETTLEMENT 20 YEARS LATER 1 (2018)
(“Over the past 20 years, from FY2000 to FY2019, the states have spent just 2.6 percent of their
total tobacco-generated revenue on tobacco prevention and cessation programs.”).
14. Transfer Order at 5, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804 (J.P.M.L.
Dec. 6, 2018) (transferring Cherokee Nation v. Purdue Pharma L.P.); Transfer Order at 3, In re
Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804 (J.P.M.L. June 6, 2018) (transferring Cherokee Nation v. McKesson Corp.); see Stacy L. Leeds, Beyond an Emergency Declaration: Tribal
Governments and the Opioid Crisis, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 1013, 1019–27 (2019).
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the MDL as plaintiffs,15 along with more than 400 other tribes involved as amici.16
State Attorneys General have also tried to fight back. They have
made unprecedented use of repeated mandamus petitions to stop the
MDL in the name of “state sovereignty.”17 In July 2019, the Arizona
AG also took the unusual step of (unsuccessfully) petitioning the Supreme Court to take original jurisdiction of its fraudulent-transfer
case against the Sackler family, which controls the major manufacturer Purdue Pharma—a move widely believed to have stemmed from
the AGs’ continuing desire to keep more issues out of the MDL.18
All of these overlapping parties have cooperated and competed intensely, whether through settlement negotiations, races to their own
respective courthouses, fights over discovery or attorneys’ fees, and
even disputes over the power to sue and allot damages in the first
place. This dynamic context has been complicated by the unusually
frank ambitions of the MDL’s presiding judge, Judge Dan Polster of
the federal court in Cleveland. Judge Polster has been clear from the
start that his goal is a complete settlement of all current and potentially all future claims between plaintiffs and defendants in the litigation—those both in state and in federal court, whether under his
formal jurisdiction or not,19 and even including the 30,000 potential
localities out there that have not yet sued at all.
As I have detailed elsewhere, MDL judges are notably creative,
often inventing new forms of “unorthodox civil procedure”20 to address the complexity and volume of the cases before them. Opiates is
no exception. Judge Polster’s belief that “the other branches of gov15. For an empirical breakdown of the different types of plaintiffs in the MDL, see Roger
Michalski, MDL Immunity: Lessons from the National Prescription Opiate Litigation, 69 AM. U.
L. REV. 175, 190 (2019) (counting eighty-one tribal plaintiffs as of February 2019).
16. Brief Amici Curiae of 448 Federally Recognized Tribes in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Tribal Claims at 1, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 1:17-md-02804-DAP
(N.D. Ohio Oct. 5, 2018); see also Order, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 1:17-md-02804DAP (N.D. Ohio June 4, 2018) (creating a separate litigation track for all federally recognized
tribes).
17. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Mandamus of State of Ohio at 19, In re State of Ohio, No. 193827 (6th Cir. Aug. 30, 2019).
18. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Arizona Files Novel Lawsuit in Supreme Court Over Opioid Crisis,
N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/31/us/politics/arizona-supremecourt-opioid-sackler.html; Anita Snow & Geoff Mulvihill, Arizona asks for US Supreme Court
involvement in opioid case, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 31, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/
7ce825bc554d40248ab6be0c4fad887c.
19. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class at 3, In re Nat’l Prescription
Opiate Litig., 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Sept. 11, 2019) (certifying the negotiation class
because it paves the way to global settlement).
20. Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the
Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1689 (2017).
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ernment, federal and state, have punted” the public health crisis to the
“federal court[s]”21 and his intent to resolve it, has led to unprecedented action. This has held true for both Judge Polster, who has encouraged the invention of creative new procedural forms to help
tackle the problem of how to bind (and preclude) parties who are not
before his court and may not have even sued yet, as well as for the
state AGs, who have made unprecedented attempts to resist the
MDL’s gravitational pull.22
The state AGs have cried “federalism” time and time again. They
argue that they, not their localities, speak for their states and that
their suits should effectively preempt their local governments’ abilities
to sue. They have argued that one of Judge Polster’s most important
procedural innovations, the novel concept of a “negotiation class”
which, like a class action, would bind current and future suing localities to negotiate and settle together, undermines the AGs’ state sovereignty and is unconstitutional. At the same time, the AGs are in tense
contests with their own state legislatures, with stinging memories of
diverted tobacco recoveries, as they devise ways to tie up any opioid
remedies for direct use on opioid prevention and cessation programs.
Is this “dialectical litigation”23 a good thing? Is it sustainable? In a
new Article, Elizabeth Burch and I detail some of the benefits that
sharper attention to federalism has indeed brought the opioid MDL,
including more information production, more momentum, and more
diverse judicial input.24 Opiates has both exposed MDL’s nationalist
tendency to steamroll over federalism but at the same time—particularly in more recent months—has shown how strong federalist forces
can dislodge and disperse the MDL’s force. Opiates has seen unusual
disruptions of the usual MDL nationalism because of its high salience
and the participation of many MDL outsiders unwilling to play by the
usual insiders’ rules. It shows us the options of what exists and what
might be when it comes to the national-state litigation balance.
There are also some real puzzles here. One of the most prominent
relates to the challenge of preclusion—how to get to “global peace,”
21. Transcript of Proceedings at 4, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 1:17-md-02804-DAP
(N.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2018).
22. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Mandamus of State of Ohio at 19, In re State of Ohio, No. 193827 (6th Cir. Aug. 30, 2019).
23. Cf. Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus
and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1046–52 (1977) (describing a paradigm of dialectical federalism in which federal and state courts engage in productive, overlapping conversations, each with
unique roles to play).
24. See generally Abbe R. Gluck & Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, MDL Revolution, 95 N.Y.U.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
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which defendants often require to reach settlement, when there are so
many cases in different jurisdictions and future potential cases still not
filed. The most interesting development in this vein has been the
emergence of bankruptcy as an odd solution to the federalism problem. Federal bankruptcy court has a unique set of powers not given to
other federal courts especially relevant in this context: the bankruptcy
court can halt all state litigation (and indeed all litigation) against a
defendant and bring all current and future claimants to the table regardless of where cases are filed. It is distinctively anti-federalist in
that sense. And it is uncomfortably more powerful in this regard—
even though it is just an Article I federal court—than either an Article
III federal court or any state court.
For that reason, the bankruptcy court’s efforts to settle claims
against Purdue, which filed for bankruptcy in 2019, have been much
simpler than Judge Polster’s efforts to achieve voluntary cooperation—and preclusion—with fifty states and the federal MDL parties,
which include some two dozen more defendants. But resorting to
bankruptcy is not practical for most defendants and hardly seems the
intended design for resolution of thousands of national claims brought
in state and federal courts alike.
This Essay aims to map out this complicated landscape of MDL nationalism and federalism, illustrating the various vectors—state/local,
AG/other branches, and state/federal—at play. There is much more to
say about what Burch and I call the “MDL Revolution”—all the ways
in which the modern MDL chafes at the traditional norms and
processes of civil procedure.25 As we detail, MDLs are marked by unusual procedural creativity; they afford surprisingly little weight to the
due process rights of plaintiffs, who cannot opt out of an MDL and
who are not guaranteed counsel who adequately represent them; they
engage in far too little motion practice; they often operate under intense secrecy; and they are shielded from routine appellate review.26
At the same time, MDLs have beneficially opened the courthouse
doors to many who have been shut out, an unorthodox workaround to
the obstacles of modern litigation and the Court’s stingy class action
jurisprudence.27 Burch and I explore these complexities and challenges in detail in other work.28
Here, I aim to highlight just the federalism piece of that larger project. Part I situates MDL in the broader story of the development of
25.
26.
27.
28.

See generally id.
Id. (manuscript at 48–64).
Id. (manuscript at 48).
See generally id.
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“unorthodox civil procedure” in response to civil procedure’s still-federalist structures. Part II sketches the MDL-federalism story, as we
understood it before the opioid cases, with examples from other litigation. Part III highlights the different ways in which federalism has
emerged in the context of Opiates specifically. The Essay concludes
with some reflections about what this emerging landscape means and
where we go from here.
II. WHERE WE ARE: NATIONALISM, FEDERALISM,
UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING

AND

Let us consider where we are: modern MDL is largely a response to
national litigation in a federalist legal system. It addresses the challenge of litigating parallel cases that arise across the fifty states in a
national economy, where class actions are hard to come by, especially
when fifty different states’ laws are at issue.
To be sure, MDL didn’t start out this way. The MDL statute was
enacted in 1968 to address the limited problem of a rash of antitrust
litigation against electrical equipment manufacturers that inundated
federal courts across the country.29 The statute expressly contemplates
that the MDL court would have only pre-trial jurisdiction, to address
concerns about duplicative discovery or conflicting pre-trial motions
in similar horizontal claims across the country.30 But as the MDL has
evolved, its essence has changed. The reality is that once centralized,
more than ninety-seven percent of MDLs terminate or settle in the
MDL court, never to return whence they came.31 Burch and I have
termed this the “MDL paradox”—because what justifies MDL from a
formal perspective is that although the MDL court lacks jurisdiction
over all the cases before it, the final disposition occurs in the homedistrict federal court which does indeed have jurisdiction.32 In practice, this could not be further from the truth, and it gives the MDL,
once created, incredible leverage against any lawsuits outside of it in
parallel systems.

29. See Bradt, supra note 2, at 854–63; Gluck, supra note 20, at 1671–72.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2018).
31. See ADMIN. OFF. U.S. COURTS, Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation – Judicial Business 2019, https://www.uscourts.gov/judicial-panel-multidistrict-litigation-judicial-business-2019
(noting that, since its inception, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has centralized
722,146 civil actions for pre-trial proceedings and remanded a total of 16,918, or 2.3%, of those).
32. See generally Gluck & Burch, supra note 24.
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A. Unorthodox Civil Procedure
In previous work, I have labeled MDLs “unorthodox civil procedure.”33 This term borrows from theories outside of the procedure
literature that describe the increasing number of ways in which traditional legal structures have informally evolved to address pragmatic
concerns of modern lawmaking. In the field of legislation, as I have
chronicled,34 there is an analogous rise of “unorthodox lawmaking”—
political scientists’ term for Congress’s increased use of legislative
pathways and vehicles that do not track the textbook, “how-a-bill-becomes-a-law” paradigm.35
I have already made many connections between those developments and the rise of MDLs. Newly developed mechanisms to bypass
traditional, sometimes cumbersome, legislative procedures—such as
committee consideration and the filibuster—find parallels in the ways
in which MDLs find more efficient paths to discovery and claim narrowing, and bypass trial altogether. With respect to federalism in particular, just as changes to the national legislative landscape have called
into question traditional lawmaking models, so too does this era of
sweeping national litigation pose challenges to earlier paradigms. Indeed, such was the case in the late 1930s when, not coincidentally, we
welcomed the FRCP, the New Deal, and the Administrative Procedure Act at essentially the same time.36 That was a moment for introspection about our legal system, its needs, and how it changes. This
may be another.
B. Our Federalist Procedure System
One way to think about the recent rise of the MDL is to view its
development through the lens of the more general tensions between
nationalism and federalism in civil procedure. Procedure’s current
doctrines of jurisdiction, choice of law, and class action all effectuate a
relatively federalist view of the world that in some ways is incompatible with the modern concept of a nationally integrated economy.
MDLs highlight and respond to that pressure by working around
those doctrines.
33. Gluck, supra note 20, at 1677.
34. See Abbe R. Gluck et al., Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 1789, 1789–90 (2015).
35. BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE
U.S. CONGRESS 256–59 (5th ed. 2017).
36. Gluck, supra note 20, at 1678.
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1. The Doctrines
Look first at the current doctrines. The law of personal jurisdiction
clings to antiquated concepts of territoriality and emphasizes state
sovereignty. It still does not accommodate a concept of minimum contacts for jurisdictional purposes based on the premise that goods may
be aimed at the United States as a whole (the idea of a national economy) rather than at a particular state.37 Justice Kennedy’s assessment
in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro offers a recent and memorable iteration of this conclusion: “[P]ersonal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis.”38 Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California reaffirmed the Supreme
Court’s rejection of a conception of specific jurisdiction grounded in
the fact of a national economy.39 The Court addressed these principles
again recently in two consolidated products liability cases against Ford
Motor Company argued in October Term 2020.40 The question in the
cases is whether a plaintiff may assert jurisdiction over a defendant
who does business in her state but where the injury in question did not
stem from specific contacts with that state.41 At oral argument, Justice
Kagan noted “federalism has become an at least equivalent concern in
the due process cases as fairness,” even as Justice Alito pointed out
that “the world in 2020 is completely different” from the world in
1945, when the Court decided its foundational specific jurisdiction
case, International Shoe.42
With respect to choice of law, the Erie doctrine still reigns and is, of
course, state-centered. Erie requires federal courts to apply the substantive law of the state.43 This requirement, in turn, makes many nationwide damages suits unamenable to class certification because
federal courts tend to view differences across state law as fatal to Rule
23’s commonality requirement.44 National litigation, then, must look
elsewhere.
37. For a rarely used exception, see FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) (allowing for personal jurisdiction
over a defendant not subject to jurisdiction in any state).
38. 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011).
39. 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780–82 (2017) (barring the state of California from adjudicating claims by
non-Californians for drugs that were bought, ingested, and caused harm outside California).
40. Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct.
916 (2020); Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 443 P.3d 407, 411 (Mont. 2019), cert.
granted, 140 S. Ct. 917 (2020).
41. Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 747–49, 755; Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 443 P.3d at 411.
42. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, 54, Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., No. 19-368 (argued
Oct. 7, 2020); cf. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945).
43. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
44. See Genevieve G. York-Erwin, Note, The Choice-of-Law Problem(s) in the Class Action
Context, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1793, 1794, 1798–99 (2009).
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The civil procedure literature does not contain nearly as much discussion of this nationalism–federalism tension as one might suppose.
The existing work tends to be limited to the classic minimum-contacts
teaching cases, such as Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of
California45 and McIntyre.46 For decades, the Court has infamously
failed to produce a majority opinion on that question and has never
concluded that merely putting one’s product in the stream of American national commerce would suffice; instead—unless the Ford cases
change that—connection to a specific state is likely still necessary.47
Enter MDLs.
The famous civil procedure chestnuts do not concern the fact pattern that most often gives rise to the MDL. Instead, they concern
where jurisdiction might lie for an international defendant who aims
products at the U.S. economy, whereas many of the biggest MDLs
involve American defendants.48 Thus, the issue is not whether there is
a forum in which the defendant can be sued. Rather, the issue in
MDLs tends to be that the defendant can be sued in too many places.
Although the drafters of the MDL statute may not have envisioned
how pervasive the MDL has become or how it is now used, the statute
from the start was indeed always intended to address this kind of
problem, namely, cases in which “massive filings . . . are reasonably
certain to occur” in different jurisdictions.49
One area in which procedure doctrine has arguably modernized in
recent years—and done so at least in part as a reaction to the expansion of the national economy—is general jurisdiction. As most Court
watchers know, general jurisdiction was essentially a static doctrine
for more than 50 years, until the Court in 2011, in Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, embarked on what now appears to be
a multi-case process of reviving, clarifying and modernizing the doctrine in response to current economic conditions.50 The general jurisdiction cases are modern because they actually acknowledge and
strive to find a workable way to deal with the fact that many companies now do business in every state. Before Goodyear, general jurisdiction was tied to the concept of territorial jurisdiction—a concept
45. 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987).
46. 564 U.S. 873, 877 (2011).
47. Gluck, supra note 20, at 1682.
48. Id.
49. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-1130, at 3 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1899.
50. 564 U.S. 915, 919–20 (2011); Gluck, supra note 20, at 1685; Meir Feder, Goodyear,
“Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671, 672
(2012) (describing Goodyear’s “far-reaching effects on both the doctrine and theory of general
jurisdiction . . . cast[ing] doubt on a large body of lower court case law.”).
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even more antiquated than the state-tied stream-of-commerce doctrine discussed in the specific jurisdiction context.51 There may be
something in this evolving story linked to the rise of MDL.
2. The Docket
The way in which the MDL docket has evolved also supports the
theory that the nationalization of the economy has been a driving
cause of the MDL’s rise. Early MDLs focused on isolated incidents,
such as airline crashes and “common disaster.”52 Prior to 1990, only
six products liability actions had been consolidated into MDLs.53 As
of December 2019, however, it was those very cases that had taken
over the docket.54 Moreover, each product-liability MDL tends to
have many more individual cases consolidated within it than other
types of MDLs, meaning that products liability actions dominate the
MDL docket. Antitrust was second, at 24.7% of the docket.55
This shift is consistent with the understanding that modern MDLs
are motivated by the way companies now do business on a national
scale—and so the harm they inflict affects potential plaintiffs across
the country. In the words of one judge: “We are in an era of mass
litigation and mass marketing. Think about things like FDA warnings.
It’s all en masse and when you have that, it’s about nationalizing
litigation.”56
But think about how a mindset of “nationalizing litigation”—the
concept of a “nationwide case”—might permeate these cases and
change the judicial approach to them. It goes to more than just flexing
MDL muscle to effectively assert pseudo-jurisdiction over large numbers of cases not formally before the MDL court. It also goes to how
the MDL judge thinks about the states and the differences among
their laws. One of the more famous MDL judges, Jack Weinstein, notably opined that there was a tort “law of national consensus”57 because he had discovered in an earlier MDL that he needed a “unitary
51. Feder, supra note 50, at 672.
52. Emery G. Lee III et al., Multidistrict Centralization: An Empirical Examination, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 211, 222 (2015).
53. Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 793 (2010).
54. U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS: JANUARY
THROUGH DECEMBER 2019 (2020), https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Calen
dar_Year_Statistics-2019_1.pdf (indicating that, of 190 pending MDLs, products-liability MDLs
were the most common, comprising 34.2% of the docket).
55. Id.
56. Gluck, supra note 20, at 1684 (internal citations omitted).
57. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 701 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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law to govern a multistate mass tort dispute[.]”58 Of course, there is
no such things national tort law. That’s one enduring aspect of Erie.
C. State Courts and AGs
Every lawyer knows that federal courts are not the only game in
town. Many cases that wind up in MDL could wind up in state court
too. State AGs, although not the only state-court actors, are the most
salient, and have their own unique ways of working together and
bringing cases that differ from those in the MDL. AGs do not typically
bring class actions or operate in federal court. Rather, they work together in “multistate actions,” engaging in pre-complaint investigations—AGs have much broader pre-filing discovery powers than
ordinary litigants—and then typically bring their own cases, or enter
settlements, at home. State AGs are political actors and have different
interests from some private litigants—both in being visible in their
own home-state courts and also in resolving ongoing harms quickly.
The MDL, in contrast, is a federal animal aimed at reducing duplicative pre-trial efforts, coordinating discovery and motion practice.
While MDLs often ask state AGs to cooperate and coordinate with
their efforts, it can be difficult when the AGs’ practice norms are so
dissimilar. As in the opioid litigation, AGs do not always want to submit to the settlement oversight of a federal court that has no jurisdiction over their state cases.
III. MDLS

AND

FEDERALISM BEFORE OPIOIDS

The federalism tension in the opioid litigation is not a new development in MDL generally, although it is true that Opiates has pressed
the edges of heretofore-accepted MDL exceptionalism to the extreme.
Long before Opiates, MDLs have involved AGs and the private bar,
even in circumstances in which the AGs may not have filed any federal or removable action and are not “in” the MDL (as is now largely
the case in Opiates).
Even as many MDL state-court coordination efforts have been successful, state judges have also reported feeling “bullied” by the
MDL.59 Complicated issues have arisen with respect to questions like
attorneys’ fees. Consider the controversial concept of a “Common
58. Howard M. Erichson, Judge Jack Weinstein and the Allure of Antiproceduralism, 64
DEPAUL L. REV. 393, 405 (2015).
59. Gluck, supra note 20, at 1705 (reporting interviews of state court judges about MDL
collaboration).
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Benefit Fund”60— lawyers in the parallel state action have often been
asked to contribute to the lead attorneys’ fees in the MDL. Some
MDLs have required such contributions as preconditions for global
peace, a practice that often rankles state judges and the lawyers, including AGs, in the state cases.61
Previous MDLs also have raised federalism concerns related to
their propensity to obfuscate and smooth over differences across state
laws. The drive to settle from the beginning in many cases mutes motion practice around specifics of state law, even as state-law differences are sometimes determinative for defendants. One federal judge
has claimed that MDLs dangerously “mush” fifty state laws
together.62
Joint coordination orders between courts overseeing parallel state
and federal cases are common fare, and often include agreements
ranging from joint discovery to joint settlements. For example, in the
Volkswagen MDL, although California joined the MDL, forty-four
states proceeded in parallel in their state courts on state claims.63
States coordinated and formed their own leadership to negotiate. All
received payment.64 The BP Oil Spill MDL eventually comprised
more than 100,000 private party plaintiffs, plus the five Gulf coast and
some localities. Alabama’s AG served as coordinating counsel for the
state interests.65 The cases eventually settled through the MDL; as
part of the deal, the state AGs did not oppose the common benefit
fees.66
60. See Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing
Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 129 (2010) (“Because
many hands contribute to the success of MDLs, doling out shares in common fund fee awards is
unavoidably messy.”). See generally Eldon E. Fallon, Common Benefit Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 371, 375 (2014) (“The [Common Benefit Fund] is created by taxing persons other than a particular client for legal services beneficial to such persons thus spreading the
cost of the litigation to all beneficiaries of these services.”).
61. FED. JUD. CTR. ET AL., COORDINATING MULTIJURISDICTION LITIGATION: A POCKET
GUIDE FOR JUDGES 7 (2013), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2014/Coordinating-Multijurisdiction-Litigation-FJC-2013.pdf (describing how “the common benefit approach can create
conflict”).
62. Gluck, supra note 20, at 1689, 1691.
63. See Adam S. Zimmerman, The Global Convergence of Global Settlements, 65 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1053, 1079 (2017).
64. Press Release, Volkswagen reaches settlement agreements with U.S. federal regulators,
private plaintiffs and 44 U.S. states on TDI diesel engine vehicles, VOLKSWAGEN (June 28, 2016),
https://media.vw.com/en-us/releases/715.
65. See Pretrial Order No. 26 at 1, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon”, No.
2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS (E.D. La. Jan. 27, 2011) (establishing Coordinating Counsel for the government parties).
66. See Order & Reasons [Aggregate Common Benefit Fee and Costs Award] at 11–15, 42, In
re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon”, No. 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS (E.D. La. Oct. 25,
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But tensions arise, not only on the subject of legal fees, but also
with respect to control. As one state court judge interviewed for a
previous study said: “If I get the case first I hit the ground running to
get out in front of the MDL. We want to cooperate and coordinate but
we don’t want to cooperate and coordinate ourselves out of the system.”67 Some of the federal judges likewise have emphasized the need
to issue their own joint coordination orders early to “be sure the MDL
case gets out front . . . This is one place the plaintiff’s and defendant’s
interest in the MDL are aligned, both wanted me to get state judges
under control, and to ignore objections of state plaintiffs’ counsel.”68
A recent ruling from the Standard and Poor’s MDL captures the
flavor. The judge remanded all seventeen state cases back to the state
courts on grounds that “the State Cases arise solely under state law
and Congress has not authorized federal courts to hear such cases.”69
The judge acknowledged the enticing benefits of an MDL, noting the
“natural tempt[ation] to find federal jurisdiction every time a multibillion dollar case with national implications arrives at the doorstep of
a federal court,” and the fact that “the federal courts undoubtedly
have advantages over their state counterparts when it comes to managing a set of substantial cases filed in jurisdictions throughout the
country.”70 But ultimately he concluded:
[E]fficiency is not the only interest served by this country’s federalist system of state and federal courts . . . [T]his Court is not free to
disregard or evade [t]he limits upon federal jurisdiction, whether
imposed by the Constitution or by Congress . . . [W]ith few exceptions, the doors to federal court do not swing open merely because a
[party] has a national presence or is alleged to have committed
wrongdoing that is national in scope . . . or merely because litigation
in federal court might be more efficient.71

The Standard and Poor’s ruling was widely viewed to be an exceptional instance in which an MDL judge stepped on the brakes in the
name of federalism.
2016) (establishing a “a common benefit fee and cost award of $600,000,000.00” and describing
how a deal was reached between BP and others for the court to approve the motion for a common benefit fund); Order [Regarding Payment of the Gulf States’ Attorneys’ Fees and Costs] at
4–7, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon”, No. 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS (E.D. La.
Oct. 5, 2015) (barring several states’ Attorneys General from later contesting the common benefit fees after accepting money from the litigation’s Settlement Agreement and Consent Decree).
67. Gluck, supra note 20, at 1705 (quoting an unnamed state judge).
68. Id.
69. In re Stand. & Poor’s Rating Agency Litig., 23 F. Supp. 3d 378, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
70. Id. at 413 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
71. Id. at 413–14 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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OPIOID LITIGATION

The opioid litigation has made the tensions between MDL and federalism more salient than ever before. One reason for this is that the
Opioid MDL has opened the door to an unprecedented array of actions by local governments in a context in which AGs have their own
pending cases and are under enormous political pressure. The localities’ strategy has already been replicated in subsequent MDLs, including JUUL, and so will not be unique to Opiates. And MDL as a
vehicle for local action threatens the dominance of AGs and their
traditional mode of operation—the AG “multistate” litigation.
Opiates makes the multistate model—where AGs work together but
file fifty separate actions in fifty separate estate courts—look somewhat quaint and threatens to render it obsolete. Remember, too, that
the localities are in federal court and represented by private attorneys;
a situation when, juxtaposed against competing AG-brought cases in
state courts, creates high-stakes tensions for federalism.
Opiates has also been marked, as Burch and I note, by an unusual
number of players who are not MDL-insiders. For the past decade,
MDL has been characterized by a “what happens in MDL stays in
MDL” club culture, where repeat players know the norms and work
to safeguard them. And while AGs have been part of MDLs before,
Opiates also brings together an enormous constellation of varied
plaintiffs and more than two dozen industry defendants, a cocktail
that has introduced more outsider voices willing to challenging the
MDL’s dominance. These challengers have in fact worked to
destabilize the MDL’s gravitational pull to an unprecedented extent.
Whereas in 2019, it appeared that Cleveland would be the center of all
of the action, the AGs and other outsiders have dispersed power to
the states and, especially now, also to the bankruptcy court in New
York.
The following discussion primarily focuses on the state AGs because of the classic federalism questions about the concerns raised by
conflicting sovereigns, and also because a substantial share of the obstacles posed to global settlement through the MDL arise out of tensions with the state AGs. But it is important to remember, as
Theodore Rave and Zachary Clopton emphasize in this volume, the
more than 500 other, non-AG cases filed in the various state courts by
localities and individuals who prefer not to be in federal court also
raise interesting federalism questions.72
72. Zachary D. Clopton & D. Theodore Rave, Opioid Cases and State MDLs, 70 DEPAUL L.
REV. (forthcoming 2021).
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Judge Polster tried to coordinate with the AGs from the beginning,
but coordination has not held firm throughout. There have been disputes related to information disclosure, races to state court houses and
a battle over the novel “negotiation class.” There have also been intrastate federalism disputes. These developments are detailed in the
forthcoming piece with Burch, MDL Revolution.73 This Part offers
only broad brushstrokes.
A. Races to the Courthouse and Dialectical Litigation
Despite Judge Polster’s efforts to centralize in his court all movement toward resolution of the cases, he was ultimately unable to persuade several state AGs and the parallel state-court judges from
moving ahead with their own cases in their home state courts.
Oklahoma was first. In June 2017, state AG Mike Hunter filed his
complaint in state court.74 Despite repeated efforts by the MDL court
and litigating parties in the MDL to delay the state trial pending
global settlement negotiations, AG Hunter and the state judge trying
the case refused to wait.75
All but seven states’ AGs are elected, as are most state judges.76
Oklahoma revealed an elected AG eager to show himself responsive
to his citizenry at home, and an elected state-court judge presiding
over a televised and intensely reported two-week trial. These are political drivers that the MDL, despite its massive leverage even early
on, could not stop.
The threat of a state-court trial in turn creates settlement momentum in the MDL. Trial threatens factual disclosures or pattern-setting,
potentially leverage-changing, jury verdicts and awards. The
Oklahoma AG settled with manufacturers Purdue and Teva on the
eve of trial, and then won a $465 million trial verdict against Johnson
& Johnson, after a trial that revealed the company’s misleading mar73. Gluck & Burch, supra note 24.
74. See Randy Ellis, First Major Opioid Trial Begins In Oklahoma, GOVERNING (May 28,
2019), https://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/tns-oklahoma-opioid-trial-.
75. Andrew Joseph, Why Houston and other cities want nothing to do with the massive national
opioid lawsuit, STAT (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/03/27/houston-nationalopioid-lawsuit (“[S]ome officials think they might be able to get ahead of the national litigation
[by suing in state court]—no matter how fast [Judge] Polster intends to reach a deal—so they can
either get a separate settlement or go to trial before a global settlement is reached.”).
76. State Attorneys General, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/
state-attorney-generals/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location
%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Mar. 28, 2021); Judicial selection in the states,
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Judicial_selection_in_the_states (last visited Mar. 28,
2021).
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keting practices.77 The Oklahoma AG’s solitary action also gave the
public access to a great deal evidence on both sides: 33 days of televised trial testimony, 874 exhibits, and 42 witnesses.78
That in turn created a frenzy toward settlement in the MDL before
the next round of cases (those were to be bellwether trials created by
the MDL itself, followed by a state-court trial in New York—which
was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic). And that in turn
spurred the MDL judge to encourage the parties to innovate new
forms of procedure to try to advance settlement negotiations. The result was a new form of class action—the “negotiation class”—which
sought to bind future and yet-to-file parties for purposes of negotiating settlement.79
AGs both led negotiations and opposed them. Ohio’s AG, Dave
Yost, publicly complained at one point that the four state AGs leading
negotiations “don’t speak for Ohio,”80 a reminder that horizontal federalism (state-state) tensions were also in the mix.
Pretrial action in the Massachusetts state trial also contributed to
changes in bargaining leverage, public pressure, and momentum in the
MDL. In particular, public disclosures of evidence about Purdue and
the Sackers’ efforts to capitalize on the addictive properties of
opioids81—despite the fact that Judge Polster had tried to impose a
confidentiality order on his side in the MDL—created both conflict
and opportunity.82 Massachusetts’s novel lawsuit against members of
the Sackler family led other states to amend their complaints thereaf77. See Nate Raymond & Jonathan Stempel, Oklahoma judge reduces Johnson & Johnson
opioid payout to $465 million, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2019, 2:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-opioids-litigation-oklahoma/oklahoma-judge-reduces-johnson-johnson-opioid-payoutto-465-million-idUSKBN1XP27F.
78. Judgment After Non-Jury Trial ¶ 2, Oklahoma ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No.
CJ-2017-816 (Ok. Dist. Ct. Aug. 26, 2019).
79. See, e.g., Jeff Overley, Opioid MDL ‘Negotiation Class’ Wins Approval, LAW360 (Sept. 11,
2019, 5:39 PM). The idea of the negotiation class is to extend the class-action framework from
Rule 23 to negotiations. It would allow the class to bargain as a collective on the front end,
prevent later infighting and splintering among plaintiffs, and give defendants a sense of the scope
of peace they will obtain on the back end (without having to wait and see how many members
opt out).
80. Jeff Overley, State AGs Reach $48B Proposed Deal to End Opioid Cases, LAW360 (Oct.
21, 2019, 5:52 PM).
81. See The Commonwealth’s Pre-Hearing Memorandum for the Hearing Set for January 25,
2019, Commonwealth v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1884-cv-01808 (BLS2) (Mass. Sup. Ct. Jan. 15,
2019); Vince Sullivan, Purdue Files Ch. 11 Suit Seeking Stay Of Opioid Litigation, LAW360
(Sept. 19, 2019, 6:17 PM); Chris Villani, Purdue Says Mass. Opioid Suit Sets Dangerous Precedent, LAW360 (Aug. 2, 2019, 7:04 PM).
82. In June 2018, the Massachusetts AG filed her own case in Massachusetts state court. Later
that year, she filed a heavily redacted amended complaint with further allegations and details
about the Sackler family. Media outlets pushed for disclosure of the information, and the state
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ter or file new suits against members of the family entirely.83 The
Sacklers were also then brought into the MDL as named, individual
defendants by myriad plaintiffs, including localities.84 The Massachusetts state judge noted at the time that the state “court is not bound by
the parties’ designation of information or documents as confidential
[in the federal protective order].”85
At a broader level, these dialectical moves brought benefits to the
MDL not seen when MDL’s nationalism full works as a steamroller.
The localities’ aggressive litigation efforts spurred those of the AGs,
and then urged the federal Department of Justice to act. Each AG
move then reinjected energy into the MDL. In addition, the very existence of cases outside of the MDL court not only generated public
information in a world typically marked by transparency but also
moved the needle on substantive state-law development. As Burch
and I detail, the drive to settle that is typical in MDLs has stymied a
great deal of substantive state tort-law development.86 For example,
even after tobacco, guns, and now opioids, the law on the tort of public nuisance that underlies a lot of these actions is surprisingly underdeveloped because the cases are settled, not tried, and often lack even
basic motion practice. And while the existence of state cases cannot
substitute for the lack of appellate review of most MDL actions, the
parallel proceedings do provide some salutary legal redundancy by
giving aspects of the case to different judges and so defuse the monopoly of the federal judge.
AG ultimately supported the request, even though much of that same information, in the MDL’s
case, had been ruled confidential.
83. See Roni Caryn Rabin, New York Sues Sackler Family Members and Drug Distributors,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/28/health/new-york-lawsuitopioids-sacklers-distributors.html; Press Release, AG Jennings files suit against Sackler family
for role in opioid crisis, DEL. NEWS (Sept. 9, 2019), https://news.delaware.gov/2019/09/09/ag-jennings-files-suit-against-sackler-family-for-role-in-opioid-crisis; Press Release, Attorney General
Tong Expands Lawsuit Against Purdue, Sacklers, Alleges Fraudulent Transfer of Funds to Evade
Accountability to Connecticut Victims of Opioid Epidemic, OFF. ATT’Y GEN. CONN. (Apr. 22,
2019), https://portal.ct.gov/AG/Press-Releases/2019-Press-Releases/AG-TONG-EXPANDSLAWSUIT-AGAINST-PURDUE-SACKLERS-ALLEGES-FRAUDULENT-TRANSFEROF-FUNDS.
84. See Content Details: 17-2804 - In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, G??I???,
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCOURTS-ohnd-1_17-md-02804/USCOURTS-ohnd1_17-md-02804-0/summary (last visited Mar. 28, 2021); see, e.g., Short Form Supplementing
Complaint and Amending Defendants and Jury Demand, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig.,
No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Mar. 15, 2019) (motioning the court to permit Hancock
County, Mississippi to add members of the Sackler family to its complaint in the MDL).
85. Memorandum of Decision and Order on Emergency Motion to Terminate Impoundment
at 10, Commonwealth v. Purdue Pharma Inc., No. 1884-01808-BLS2 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Jan. 30,
2019).
86. Gluck & Burch, supra note 24 (manuscript at 44).
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B. Intrastate State Disputes: States Versus Their Own Localities
It is also important to note how Opiates has given rise to some challenging intrastate federalism issues. The first set of tensions derives
directly from the MDL: state AGs have challenged the local governments’ rights to sue at all, arguing state preemption of local action.
They filed a mandamus action in 2019, contending that “only a State
Attorney General has parens-patriae standing to prosecute claims vindicating generalized harm to a State’s inhabitants. Political subdivisions do not have parens-patriae standing,” and the MDL bellwether
“trial would fragment the State’s claims, pose a high risk of inconsistent verdicts, result in duplicative or overlapping damages, and misallocate funds in the State.”87 They also strenuously opposed the
negotiation class: twenty-six AGs filed a letter with the district court,88
followed by another letter from thirty-nine, including D.C. and Guam,
responding to plaintiffs’ notice of certification of the negotiation class.
The AGs argued that “the amended proposal inverts the relationship
between each State and its own political subdivision.”89
Former AGs also wrote a bipartisan op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, arguing that AGs have unique investigatory powers that better
situate them vis-à-vis tortfeasors than localities,90 and criticizing the
“cottage industry of law professors [that] has sprung up conjuring
novel procedural vehicles never approved by courts to wrestle cities
and counties into settlements.”91
The Sixth Circuit stuck down the negotiation class in September
2020, primarily on the ground that the concept operates entirely
outside of the Federal Rules.92
87. Petition for Writ of Mandamus of State of Ohio at 2, In re State of Ohio, No. 19-3827 (6th
Cir. Aug. 30, 2019).
88. Letter Re: Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion and Motion for Certification of Rule 23(b)(3) Cities/Counties Negotiation Class, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP
(N.D. Ohio June 24, 2019).
89. Letter from 39 State Attorneys General Re: Plaintiffs’ Renewed and Amended Notice of
Motion for Certification of Rule 23(b)(3) Cities / Counties Negotiation Class, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-2804-DAP (N.D. Ohio July 23, 2019).
90. George Jepsen & Perry Zinn Rowthorn, Opinion, Leave Opioid Lawsuits to State Attorneys General, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 3, 2019, 4:44 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/leave-opioidlawsuits-to-state-attorneys-general-11551649471.
91. Id. (“Cities and counties . . . need to show that specific people or entities committed a
specific act or omission that caused the localities—not their residents—specific damages. Even if
they meet that challenge, they arguably have to show that the legal chain of causation wasn’t
broken by prescribing doctors who could judge the risks themselves or drug dealers whose criminal activity may not be opioid companies’ legal responsibility.”).
92. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 976 F.3d 664, 672–74 (6th Cir. 2020) (“What Plaintiffs fail to appreciate is that a new form of class action, wholly untethered from Rule 23, may
not be employed by a court.”).
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Related to the AGs’ objections to the negotiation class have been
intrastate disputes over which governmental actor has the right to allocate settlement funds. In December 2019, Ohio AG Yost attempted
to place a state constitutional amendment on the ballot to establish a
foundation to distribute any opioid-related settlement funds.93 When
that effort was unsuccessful,94 Yost changed tactics and sought cooperation with other state actors. He worked with the governor to unveil a
“One Ohio” plan, which provides a formula of allocation of any settlements to the state foundation, the localities, the AG’s office, and private attorneys fees.95 Texas soon followed with a similar agreement.96
Some defendants have used the very existence of state lawsuits to
try to block the MDL altogether. In West Virginia, Defendants McKesson, Cardinal, and AmerisourceBergen have argued their previous
settlements with the state preclude federal suits on behalf of the
localities.97
C. The Federal Government
The Department of Justice (DOJ) also has been a presence. In
April 2018, DOJ expressed its desire to join settlement negotiations in
order to ensure that any ensuing settlement is “structured to serve the
public interest” and to recover some of the expenses the federal government incurred in responding to the epidemic.98 The parties tussled
with DOJ to release years of information from its Automated Records
and Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS). Upon Drug Enforce93. Memorandum from Jonathan Blanton, Deputy Att’y Gen. for Major Litig., Ohio Att’y
Gen. Office, to Dave Yost, Ohio Att’y Gen. (Dec. 2, 2019), https://assets.documentcloud.org/
documents/6569123/Proposed-Constitutional-Amendment-On-Opioid.pdf.
94. Karen Kasler, House Leaders: Opioid Settlement Amendment Won’t Make Ballot, STATEHOUSE NEWS BUREAU (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.statenews.org/post/house-leaders-opioid-settlement-amendment-won-t-make-ballot.
95. Laura A. Bischoff, Ohio unites to push for settlement in opioid lawsuits, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/local/ohio-unites-push-for-settlement-opioid-lawsuits/pyny06Y5Pg3sUMx7cBci6H.
96. Texas Opioid Abatement Fund Council and Settlement Allocation Term Sheet, TEX. ATT’Y
GEN. (May 13, 2020), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/images/admin/
2020/Press/Texas%20Term%20Sheet%20(incl%20Ex%20A-C)(Fully%20Executed).pdf; see
also Amanda Bronstad, Texas AG Reaches Deal With 254 Counties Ahead of Global Opioid
Settlement, LAW.COM (May 28, 2020. 6:05 PM), https://www.law.com/texaslawyer/2020/05/28/
texas-ag-reaches-deal-with-254-counties-ahead-of-global-opioid-settlement/
?slreturn=20210226115757 (providing detail on the deal).
97. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of McKesson Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss
or for Summary Judgment on Res Judicata and Release Grounds, City of Huntington v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Co., No. 3:17-cv-01362 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 13, 2020).
98. See United States’ Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Participate in Settlement
Discussions and as Friend of the Court at 1–2, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Apr. 2, 2018).
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ment Administration delay, Judge Polster ordered that DOJ produce
the data for six states99 and later for every state.100
In 2020, DOJ settled with Purdue in the New York bankruptcy
court, but, interestingly, voluntarily committed a large portion of settlement proceeds—some $1.775 billion—to be applied to the claims of
the states and localities—an interesting recognition of their importance of the state and local cases.101
D. Bankruptcy Court as Another Unorthodox Workaround
Bankruptcy has emerged as another unorthodox workaround to
challenges posed by nationwide cases in a federalist system.
Purdue filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Southern District of
New York in September 2019.102 An automatic stay of litigation typically attaches to a bankruptcy filing pursuant to the Bankruptcy
Code.103 However, the Code also provides a federalism exception for
suits by governments enforcing their “police and regulatory powers.”104 Purdue argued that the exceptions did not apply but, rather
than litigate the issue, filed for a preliminary injunction.105 The filing
99. Order Regarding ARCOS Data at 12, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md02804-DAP, (N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2018).
100. Second Order Regarding ARCOS Data at 1–2, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No.
1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio May 8, 2018). Judge Polster had rejected public records requests filed by the Washington Post and two West Virginia-based media to gain access to the
data, but the Sixth Circuit ultimately overruled him.
101. Press Release, Justice Department Announces Global Resolution of Criminal and Civil
Investigations with Opioid Manufacturer Purdue Pharma and Civil Settlement with Members of
the Sackler Family, OFF. PUB. AFF., U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/justice-department-announces-global-resolution-criminal-and-civil-investigations-opioid;
see Jan Hoffman & Katie Benner, Purdue Pharma Pleads Guilty to Criminal Charges for Opioid
Sales, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/health/purdue-opioidscriminal-charges.html (last updated Mar. 16, 2021).
102. See Jan Hoffman & Mary Williams Walsh, Purdue Pharma, Maker of OxyContin, Files
for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TI??? (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/15/health/purduepharma-bankruptcy-opioids-settlement.html.
103. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2018); see generally Frank R. Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 177 (1978) (discussing § 362(a) in detail).
104. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4); see also Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 960 (2012) (arguing that “bankruptcy serves as
a better model for judging when to use, and how to order, nonclass aggregation of mass tort
litigation.”).
105. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief, In re Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 19-23649-rdd (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2019) (“Debtors in no way concede that the Governmental Actions fall within
the limited ‘police power’ exception to the automatic stay . . . But, because the stakes to the
Debtors are so high, the Debtors cannot risk a case-by-case or claim-by-claim litigation of the
scope of the automatic stay . . . Instead, the Debtors ask that this Court stay the tidal wave of
litigation that will drown the Debtors and most certainly frustrate their successful
reorganization.”).
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argued: “Protection from uncontrolled litigation is the singular feature
of bankruptcy that makes it an effective tool for the successful resolution of mass tort matters.”106
The bankruptcy court did not rule on the applicability of the government exception to the automatic stay under the law but granted a
temporary stay to allow settlement negotiations to proceed.
There is precedent for this unusual use of bankruptcy in megaMDLs. In the Takata MDL, which grew out of the thousands of lawsuits against the airbag manufacturing company,107 even non-debtors—that is, industry defendants not in bankruptcy themselves—used
the bankruptcy process to settle parts of the MDL case. So-called
“channeling injunctions” have been justified by bankruptcy courts
under their general equitable authority under the Bankruptcy Code,
which empowers them to issue “any order, process, or judgment that
is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions” of the Code.108
Channeling injunctions also were used by doctors and distributors in
connection with Dow Corning’s bankruptcy over breast implants.109
This role for bankruptcy highlights some interesting issues. First, the
bankruptcy court’s power to stop all litigation to resolve all current
and future pending claims against the debtor, both ends the race-tothe-courthouse and deals with the issue of future preclusion even in
the absence of a class action. The parties in the opioid MDL are concerned not only about parallel state lawsuits, but also about the more
than 30,000 other localities that have not yet sued. Bankruptcy court
provides one answer. What is more, bankruptcy court seems to be the
only court with jurisdiction to stop both state and federal cases alike—
an odd result given that the bankruptcy court is not even an Article III
federal court. In other words, while bankruptcy court may be a helpful
workaround in the limited instances in which a company is indeed prepared to go bankrupt, it seems far from any considered or broadly
applicable solution to the federalism challenges that the U.S. Consti106. Debtor’s Informational Brief at 6, In re Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 19-23649-rdd (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2019).
107. See generally Airbag maker Takata files for bankruptcy in Japan and US, seeking $1.6B
aid from Key Safety Systems, REUTERS (June 26, 2017, 2:51 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/
25/takata-files-for-us-chapter-11-bankruptcy-in-delaware-expected-to-file-in-japan-soon.html.
108. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2018); see generally Eric D. Green et al., Future Claimant Trusts and
“Channeling Injunctions” to Resolve Mass Tort Environmental Liability in Bankruptcy: The MetCoil Model, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 157 (2005).
109. See Gary Svirsky et al., A Field Guide to Channeling Injunctions And Litigation Trusts,
260 N.Y. L.J. SPECIAL REP. (July 16, 2018). The protected non-debtor’s alleged liability derives
from the debtor’s alleged liability: the non-debtor contributes to the settlement fund, and the
non-debtor has a sufficient “unity of interest” with the debtor. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\70-2\DPL206.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 23

THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC

16-DEC-21

15:55

343

tution and the Federal Rules and supporting statutes pose for resolving nationwide cases in our federalist system.
V. CONCLUSION
Unorthodox procedures tend to emerge, and then grow, when the
confines of the current system no longer work well. Justice Kennedy
noted in McIntyre that, there is no such thing yet as nationwide jurisdiction.110 But MDLs often effectively assert something similar to it.
MDL courts that may have no jurisdiction over far-flung federal lawsuits still resolve claims brought by those plaintiffs dragged into the
MDL from federal courts across the country with no option to opt out.
MDL courts compel state attorneys litigating parallel cases to contribute attorneys’ fees toward MDL lawyers in an effort toward global
peace across jurisdictions. MDLs exert power over state actors and
state cases to coordinate, guard information, settle, and preclude.
They often do not see a need to consider the nuances of differences
across state law, much less welcome motion practice to develop it.
Their rulings, whether on issues of jurisdiction, federalism or anything
else, are rarely reviewed.
Justice Kennedy also suggested the possibility that Congress could
enact a nationwide-jurisdiction statute to address harms directed to
the U.S. economy as a whole, or perhaps even nationwide-tort claims
as in Opiates.111 The Amchem litigation, which involved the creation
of a “settlement class” in order to resolve millions of dollars of claims
brought by asbestos victims across the country in the 1990s raised similar concerns, with Congress trying but failing to enact a special federal statute to resolve those cases.112 Congress did pass such a statute
after September 11th, and some experts likewise have called for a special opioid-litigation statute and one for claims anticipated to arise out
of COVID-19.
MDL’s organic evolution into a nationalist animal makes evident
the needs of modern litigation and perhaps the need for serious consideration of such new federal statutes. On the other hand, the lack of
a formal federal rule on MDL nationalism still leaves some space for
litigation federalism when the parties insist on asserting it. That has
turned out to be the case in Opiates, to the surprise of many, given
how dominant the MDL seemed at the outset. And the federalist
voices have indeed brought benefits that disperse some of the con110. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884–86 (2011).
111. Id. at 885 (suggesting that “Congress could authorize the exercise of jurisdiction in appropriate courts.”).
112. See, e.g., Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005, S. 852, 109th Cong. (2005).
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cerns about MDL monopoly in general—including concerns about
transparency, reviewability, substantive-law development and access
to court for diverse litigants.
There also may be other ways—with smaller steps—to delve into
this area than enacting a law of nationwide jurisdiction. As Burch and
I note, we could inject more federalism considerations into MDL procedure, for example, by requiring more guardrails about and reviewability of jurisdictional formality, or more attention to state law
differences, including more motion practice or episodic remands.113
Or we could rethink some of the stinginess of Rule 23 when it comes
to certifying class actions that involve differences across state law; that
would introduce some of the protections of class actions into the MDL
environment. Judges and many MDL insiders resist exploring such
tweaks because they relish the flexibility that MDL’s relative lack of
ruleishness gives courts faced with sprawling cases and nationwide
harms. But outsiders are beginning to clamor for them.
The big questions here are how much nationalization of litigation
we want; how much is constitutionally permissible; and how much can
no longer realistically be avoided. Burch and I delve into these and
other areas for broader MDL reform in MDL Revolution. Opiates
suggests the time is ripe for a deeper look.

113. See generally Gluck & Burch, supra note 24.

